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NOTES
SECTION 401 (b) OF THE HEALTH PROGRAMS
EXTENSION ACT: AN ABORTIVE ATTEMPT BY
CONGRESS TO RESOLVE A CONSTITUTIONAL
DILEMMA
In Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, the Supreme Court held that
the right to privacy guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment encom-
passes a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. In the wake of
these decisions a conflict has surfaced between a woman's claimed right
to have an abortion or sterilization and the claimed first amendment right
of hospitals and hospital personnel to refuse on moral and religious
grounds to perform such operations. The resolution of this conflict poses
a difficult question of constitutional balancing for legislatures and courts.
The conflict first appeared in Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital,' in
which the Federal District Court for the District of Montana granted a
preliminary injunction ordering a religious hospital to perform a sterili-
zation previously refused on religious grounds.4 The court granted re-
lief for deprivation of Mrs. Taylor's civil rights under section 1983 of the
federal civil rights law.5 Prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction of such
a claim is, according to the prevailing view, a finding of state involve-
ment in the allegedly discriminatory act.6 The Taylor court, influenced
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
3. Civil No. 1090 (D. Mont., Nov. 1, 1972).
4. The hospital operated by the Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth refused to
perform the operation pursuant to the "Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Hospitals", incorporated by reference into its bylaws. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hos-
pital, 369 F. Supp. 948, 949 (D. Mont. 1973).
5. Such relief is provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and the laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . ..
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by St. Vincent's "monopoly position" as the only hospital in the city
with a maternity department," found state action in the receipt of federal
funds by the hospital under the Hill-Burton Act,' and in favorable tax
treatment afforded the hospital by the state.
The district court's preliminary injunction in Taylor precipitated the
passage9 of section 401 (b) of the Health Programs Extension Act of
1973.' ° Reacting strongly to a Catholic hospital being forced to permit
an operation repugnant to its religious precepts," Congress attempted to
prevent a recurrence of the Taylor result. Section 401 (b) provides that
receipt of Hill-Burton funds does not authorize a court or other public
authority to require a hospital or its personnel to perform abortions or
3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Con-
gress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States;
4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including
the right to vote.
7. The maternity department of Billings Deaconess Hospital was the only other com-
munity facility consolidated into St. Vincent's to reduce the cost of duplicated maternity
services. Before the consolidation, St. Vincent's informed local obstetricians and
Deaconess Hospital that it would not permit surgical sterilizations. 369 F. Supp. at
949. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit questioned St. Vincent's
monopoly status, however, citing an agreement between the two hospitals whereby
sterilizations would be performed at Deaconess after the patient had been admitted
to St. Vincent's. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital, Civil No. 74-1142 at 8 (9th Cir.
Aug. 26, 1975).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1970). Enacted in 1946, the purpose of the Hill-Burton
Program was to infuse federal money into the development and improvement of health
care facilities in the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 291. The money is given to the
states for distribution to the hospitals pursuant to state plans that must require
assurances from the recipient health care facility that, among other things, treatment
will be available to all persons residing within the state and provided for persons
unable to pay. Id. § 291c(e). In the first twenty-four years of the program's existence,
a total of 10,748 projects were approved to aid more than 3,800 communities, with
$3.7 billion in Hill-Burton funds being expended. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDucATION
AND WELFARE, HILL-BURTON PROGRAM PROGRESS REPORT JuLY 1, 1947-JuNE 30, 1971, at
9-10 (1972).
9. H.R. REP. No. 93-227, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. at 11 (1973).
10. Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-45, § 401(b), 87 Stat.
91 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7(a) (1974)).
11. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REC. S5717 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1973) (remarks of Senator
Church); id. at H4147 (daily ed. May 31, 1973) (remarks of Representative Heinz).
Senator Church was the author and sponsor of the original version of section 401 (b).
Id. at S5717 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1973).
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sterilizations, or make facilities available therefor, if refusal to do so is
based on "religious beliefs or moral convictions." 12
Reviewing its preliminary injunctioa following enactment of section
401 (b), the court in Taylor held that the Act, "[b]y its plain language
... prohibits any court from finding that a hospital which receives Hill-
Burton funds is acting under color of state law." Accordingly the court
dissolved the injunction and denied all reliefY' The Court of Appeals
12. Section 401(b) provides:
(b) The receipt of any grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee under
the Public Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health Centers
Act, or the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construc-
tion Act by any individual or entity does not authorize any court or
public official or other public authority to require-
(1) such individual to perform or assist in the performance of
any sterilization procedure or abortion if his performance or assistance
in the performance of such procedure or abortion would be contrary
to his religious beliefs or moral convictions; or
(2) such entity to-
(A) make its facilities available for the performance of any
sterilization procedure or abortion if the performance of such
procedure or abortion in such facilities is prohibited by the entity
on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions, or
(B) provide any personnel for the performance or assistance
in the performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion if the
performance or assistance in the performance of such procedure
or abortion by such personnel would be contrary to the religious be-
liefs or moral convictions of such personnel.
Health Programs Extension Act of 1973 § 401(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7(a) (1974).
Section 401(b) is complemented by section 401(c), which resulted from an amend-
ment introduced on the floor by Senator Javits. See 119 CoNG. Rac. S5725-26 (daily
ed. Mar. 27, 1973). As passed by both houses, Section 401 (c) provides:
(c) No entity which receives a grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee
under the Public Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health
Centers Act, or the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Con-
struction Act after [June 18, 1973,] may-
(1) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or termination of
employment of any physician or other health care personnel, or
(2) discriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges to any
physician or other health care personnel,
because he performed or assisted in the performance of a lawful steriliza-
tion procedure or abortion, because he refused to perform or assist in the
performance of such a procedure or abortion on the grounds that his
performance or assistance in the performance of the procedure or abortion
would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions, or because
of his religious beliefs or moral convictions respecting sterilization pro-
cedures or abortions.
Health Programs Extension Act of 1973 § 401(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7 (b) (1) (1974).
13. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 369 F. Supp. 948, 950 (D. Mont. 1973).
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for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 4 basing dismissal of the complaint on its
intervening decision in Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace'5;
there it had held that section 401 (b) prohibited the court's reliance upon
receipt of Hill-Burton funds as grounds for finding state action in order
to compel performance of sterilization or abortion procedures if such
procedures were contrary to the religious or moral convictions of those
refusing to perform them.
Not only is the Taylor and Chrisman interpretation of section 401 (b)
not mandated "by the plain language of the statute," 16 but this interpre-
tation renders the statute an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial
powers. More limited readings of the statute that are consonant with
congressional intent and constitutional requirements are possible; this
Note will develop these more sound alternative interpretations of section
401 (b) and examine the fallacies of Taylor and Chrisman.
HILL-BURTON FUNDS AND STATE AcTIoN
Roe v. Wadea7 and Doe v. BoltoZ'8 established the principle that a
woman's decision to abort her pregnancy is encompassed within the ex-
panding right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. 9 Far
14. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital, Civil No. 74-1142 (9th Cir., Aug. 26, 1975).
15. 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974).
16. 369 F. Supp. at 950.
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
19. Nowhere does the word "privacy" appear in the Constitution. Although long a
topic of scholarly concern, see, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HAtv, L. REV. 193 (1890), the right to privacy was not recognized as an independent
constitutional right until the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine,
64 Mci. L. REV. 219, 228-33 (1965). Seven Justices concurred in the result but dis-
agreed as to the source of the right. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, found
a "zone of privacy" emanating from the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amend-
ments, 381 U.S. at 484. Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan, relied on the ninth amendment, id. at 499; Justices Harlan and
White relied on the fourteenth amendment, id. at 500, 507.
In Griswold the Court declared unconstitutional (as an unwarranted intrusion into
the right of marital privacy) a state statute prohibiting the use, even by married
couples, of contraceptives. Later cases have expanded the right of privacy to include
"the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
(declaring unconstitutional a state statute forbidding distribution of contraceptives
to single persons). TWade and Bolton added the abortion decision to the specific list
of activities encompassed by the right of privacy under the fourteenth amendment,
[Vol. 17:303
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from settling the issue, however, these cases spawned a variety of state
and local laws limiting the right to obtain an abortion. Statutes have been
passed requiring consent by spouse, parents, or putative father,20 or pro-
hibiting the use of Medicaid funds to reimburse an indigent woman for a
nontherapeutic abortion.2' The right to obtain an abortion upheld by
Wade and Bolton is not absolute; at certain points in a woman's preg-
nancy the state acquires a compelling interest to protect first the health
of the mother, and later that of the viable fetus.2 2 Another potential lim-
itation to the impact of Wade and Bolton is that even though they es-
tablish the right to abortion, they do not expressly impose a duty on the
state to provide facilities for performing abortions.2 Thus the pregnant
woman who could find no hospital willing to perform the procedure
might get little consolation from her guaranteed right to an abortion. In
subsequent decisions, however, lower courts have taken steps to remedy
this situation. On the basis of the Supreme Court decisions, these courts
Wade indicating that abortion also would be covered by a right of privacy founded
on the ninth amendment. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). The right to privacy
expressed in Wade and Bolton has been interpreted to include the right to voluntary
sterilization. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital, 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973).
See also Comment, Prohibition of Sterilization: Hospital Prerogative or Negative
Pregnant?, 54 BOSTON U.L. Rzv. 828, 833-37 (1974); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional
Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 670, 713-17 (1973).
Since the Supreme Court decided WVade and Bolton, states have enacted laws
establishing reporting systems for abortions, limiting permissible facilities for abortion,
and requiring measures to save a viable fetus. Since 1973 a majority of states have
passed statutes similar to section 401(b), allowing institutions and personnel to refuse
to provide abortions on moral or religious grounds. See generally Note, Implication
of the Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litigation and Legislation, 74 CoLum.
L. REV.237 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Abortion Implications].
20. See Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 958 (1974).
21. Comzpare Doe v. Beal, 44 U.S..W. 2065 (3d Cir. July 21, 1975) (compelling
reimbursement) wvith Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975) (refusal to re-
imburse does not violate Social Security Act).
22. Under tVade and Bolton the abortion decision is solely up to the mother and
her physician during the first trimester. The state acquires a compelling interest in
the mother's health from the beginning of the second trimester; the state's interest in
the fetus becomes compelling when it reaches viability, usually at 28 weeks. At that
point the state can proscribe all abortions except those necessary to save the life of
the mother.
23. Justice Blackmun stated in dicta in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973):
"Under [the Georgia statute], the hospital is free not to admit a patient for an abor-
tion. . . . These provisions obviously are in the statute in order to afford appropriate
protection to the individual and to the denominational hospital." That these statutes
were cited with apparent approval by the Court has proved persuasive to later courts.
See notes 48-50 infra & accompanying text.
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have required public hospitals to allow voluntary sterilization procedures
and nontherapeutic abortions on the grounds that "once the state has
undertaken to provide general short-term hospital care . . . it may not
constitutionally draw the line at medically indistinguishable surgical pro-
cedures that impinge on fundamental rights." 24
Purely private hospitals remain free under Wade and BoltonY' to re-
strict the right to an abortion without exposure to liability for depriva-
tion of fundamental rights under section 1983 of the federal civil rights
laws. 28 To be cognizable under that section, the private hospital's action
24. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital, 475 F.2d 701, 706 (1st Cir. 1973)
(sterilizations). See, e.g., Doe v. Hale Hospital, 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974) (non-
therapeutic abortions); Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974),
appeal disnmissed, 95 S. Ct. 169 (1974) (nontherapeutic abortions); Orr v. Koefoot,
377 F. Supp. 673 (D. Neb. 1974) (nontherapeutic abortions). Cf. McCabe v. Nassau
County Medical Center, 453 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971) (sterilizations).
In Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cit. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W.
3242 (U.S. Sept. 20, 1975) (No. 75-442), the court declared St. Louis' city policy
against the performance of nontherapeutic abortions in public hospitals to be an
infringement of the right to privacy and a denial of equal protection to indigent
women. It also directed the district court on remand to fashion relief that would
impose upon the city the duty to obtain personnel whose personal convictions per-
mitted them to perform abortions. The city had staffed its maternity facilities entirely
from a Catholic medical school, whose students and faculty refused to perform
abortions for religious reasons. The court stated that "the city will not be allowed to
achieve indirectly through its manner of staffing its hospitals what it cannot accom-
plish directly-the prohibition of all nontherapeutic abortions in those hospitals." Id.
at 546. Cf. Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974) (striking down as over-
broad a St. Louis city ordinance regulating abortion clinics).
25. See note 23 supra & accompanying text.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 5 supra. State action for state involvement
with private activity alleged to be a deprivation of constitutional rights has been a
requirement for actions under the fourteenth amendment since the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in which the court stated:
It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.
. . . [C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against
State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals,
unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial
or executive proceedings. . . . [f [the wrongful act of an individual is]
not sanctioned in some way by the State, or not done under State
authority, [the injured party's] rights remain in full force, and may
presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for redress.
Id. at 11, 17.
Likewise, unless state action is present a private institution cannot be liable under
section 1983. See, e.g., Barrett v. United Hospital, 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
mere., 506 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1974) (hospital); Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp.
1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971) (private parochial school);
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in limiting or forbidding abortions and sterilizations must be clothed
with state action. Following the directive of Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority,27 that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct
be attributed its true significance," 28 courts have considered many in-
dicia of involvement to find state action in private activity. These indicia
Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963) (hospital).
See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 300 (1966) (Douglas, J.): "If a testator
wanted to leave a school or center for the use of one race only and in no way
implicated the State in the supervision, control, or management of that facility, we
assume arguendo that no constitutional difficulty would be encountered." (Footnote
omitted).
However, purely private acts of discrimination are within the range of sections
1981 and 1982, which have their foundation in the thirteenth amendments prohibition
of slavery and involuntary servitude, a prohibition that has been held to reach private
action in which no state action was involved. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968), held that section 1982, guaranteeing to "[all] citizens of the United
States . . . the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property," 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1970), barred private and public discrimination in the sale or rental of property.
The range of section 1982 was expanded in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc, 396
U.S. 229 (1969), in which the refusal by a corporation operating community recrea-
tional facilities to permit assignment of a membership share in a beach was held
to be an interference with the right to "lease".
Section 1981, guaranteeing to all citizens the right to make and enforce contracts,
and the right to the equal benefits of all laws for the security of person and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens, has been accorded by the Supreme Court a broad
interpretation similar to that which the Court has given section 1982. Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Rec. Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973) has been held by a lower federal
court to bar racial discrimination in admissions to purely private schools. McCrary
v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S.
Nov. 11, 1975). Finding the relationship between a school and its pupils to be a
contractual one, with the admissions process part of the formation of a contract, the
court held that the equal right to contract guaranteed by section 1981 prohibited the
rejection of a black applicant when the basis for exclusion was race and he met all
other requirements for admission. The court limited its holding by cautioning that
private schools would be free to apply any nonracial criteria that would result in a
disproportionate impact on members of one race.
Section 1985 (3) forbids a purely private conspiracy with intent to deprive others
of equal protection of the laws or equal privilege and immunities, with a "racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, insidiously discriminatory animus behind the con-
spirators' action." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971), overruling by
implication Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951) (§ 1985(3) reached only
conspiracies under color of state law).
27. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
28. Id. at 722.
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have included tax benefits,2" public funding, ° state appointees on hos-
pital governing boards, 1 leases from local government, 2 and the deter-
mination of whether a private hospital has a "monopoly" position in the
area.33 The most common element in a finding of state action, however,
has been a hospital's receipt of Hill-Burton funds.
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital" was the first appellate
decision to hold that receipt of Hill-Burton funds constituted state ac-
tion; the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit based its decision on
the "elaborate and intricate" scheme of government regulation accom-
panying Hill-Burton funding, on the Act's detailed minimum standards
for participating hospitals, and on the Act's imposition of a duty on the
state to plan for adequate hospital care. 5 Cases since Simkins have con-
tinued to stress the Hill-Burton Act's requirement of pervasive govern-
ment involvement in a private hospital's internal affairs as grounds for
finding state action.36 One court stated as a well-established principle that
"the receipt of Hill-Burton funds carries with it the obligation to ob-
serve Federal Constitutional mandates." 37
29. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., Civil No. 1090 at 3 (D. Mont., Nov. 1, 1972),
rev'd, 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973), aff'd, Civil No. 74-1142 (9th Cir., Aug. 26,
1975).
30. Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 496 F.2I 174 (4th Cir. 1974);
Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer Hosp., Inc., 437 F.2d 429, 430 (6th Cir. 1971) (six percent of
budget came from special county tax); Sosa v. Board of Mgrs. of Val Verde Mem.
Hosp., 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cit. 1971).
31. Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer Hosp., Inc., 437 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1971); Sosa v. Board
of Mgrs. of Val Verde Mem. Hosp., 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971); Meredith v. Allen
County War Mem. Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968).
32. O'Neill v. Grayson County War Mem. Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140 (6th Cit. 1973).
Contra, Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp. Corp., 573 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
44 U.S.L.V. 3328 (Dec. 2, 1975).
33. O'Neill v. Grayson County War Mem. Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973);
Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1968); Meredith v. Allen
County War Mem. Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968). Contra, Taylor v.
St. Vincent's Hosp., Civil No. 74-1142 (9th Cir. AuQ. 26, 1975).
34. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
35. 323 F.2d at 964, 968.
36. See, e.g., Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 2233 (4th
Cir. Nov. 6, 1975); Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 496 F.2d 174
(4th Cir. 1974); Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cit. 1969);
Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340
F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Mem. Hosp., 339 F. Supp.
234 (D.N.H.), aff'd sub nor. Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1972); Citta
v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
37. Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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Some commentators have gone further and stiggested that all hospitals
can be considered public institutions because of the essential public serv-
ices that private hospitals provide, the extensive regulation of all hospitals
in states participating in Hill-Burton programs,3 and most importantly,
the fact that existence of private hospitals is taken into account in dis-
bursing both state and Hill-Burton funds.-9 This impact of private hos-
pitals on governmental funding decisions is vital to the contention that
all hospitals are public entities. The argument proceeds as follows:
because a private hospital already exists to serve a given area, the state
will tend to channel available funds (including Hill-Burton funds) into
assisting that hospital, rather than into construction of a new, public hos-
pital, which (unlike the private institution) would be required to per-
form abortions and sterilizations4 ° By using the private hospital to help
fulfill its Hill-Burton Act duty of providing adequate medical care, the
state makes that hospital its agent in fulfilling a public duty; thus the
hospital assumes a quasi-public character and can no longer be con-
sidered purely private. 1
38. The court found state action present in Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th
Cir. 1964), even though the hospital had not received Hill-Burton funds, because it
had to follow the regulations prescribed by the state under the Hill-Burton program.
Id. at 713.
39. See Abortion Implications, supra note 19 at 256-57; Note, Hill-Burton Hospitals
After Roe and Doe: Can Federally Funded Hospitals Refuse to Perform Abortions?,
4 N.Y.U. REV. L.& Soc. CHANGE 83, 89-89 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hill-Burton
Hospitals].
40. See note 24 supra & accompanying text.
41. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 967, 970 (4th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964):
[Tihe defendant hospitals operate as integral parts of comprehensive
joint or intermeshing state and federal plans or programs designed to
effect a proper allocation of available medical and hospital resources
for the best possible promotion and maintenance of public health.
Giving recognition to its responsibilities for public health, the state
elected not to build publicly owned hospitals. . . . Instead it adopted and
the defendent [hospitals] participated in a plan for meeting those respon-
sibilities by permitting its share of Hill-Burton funds to go to existing
private institutions. The appropriation of such funds . . . effectively
limits Hill-Burton funds available in the future.
Support for this approach can be found in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 94 S. Ct.
2416 (1974), in which the Court acknowledged that a city's rationing of its limited
facilities to a racially discriminatory group, necessitating denial to other groups,
came "dangerously close" to the impermissible state action found in Burton. When
the city provided the exclusive use of its parks to an all-white baseball league (and
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Neither this broad analysis nor that of Sirnkins, finding state action
wherever Hill-Burton funds are received, has achieved unanimous ac-
ceptance. Some courts have required direct state involvement in the
challenged conduct to find state action. This approach was well stated
in Po'we v. Miles:4 "the state must be involved not simply with some
activity of the institution alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff
but with the activity that caused the injury .... [T] he state action, not
the private action, must be the subject of complaint." '" This approach
has meant almost certain defeat for plaintiffs seeking relief from private
hospitals refusing to perform abortions or sterilizations. Courts embrac-
ing this view require direct state involvement with the private hospitals'
policies restricting or forbidding such procedures, and when such state
influence over internal hospital policy has not been found, relief has not
been granted. These decisions are consonant with recent Supreme Court
decisions involving state action. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,45
the Court required a "sufficiently close nexus" 46 between the state and
the challenged activity of the private entity to find state action, and in
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,47 the Court required state involvement to
the park could not accommodate any more than one league), the city put its power
and prestige behind the league's racial discrimination. So here, when the state rations
its limited Hill-Burton funds to a private hospital instead of building a public hos-
pital, the state places its power and prestige behind the private hospital, making it
a partner in the private hospital's activities. Burton dictates that this constitutes
state action, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) and the
private hospital therefore must follow the same standards as the public hospital in
guaranteeing the right to have abortions and sterilizations. See cases cited note 24
supra.
42. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968). Accord, Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ.,
287 F. Supp. 535 (SD.N.Y. 1968).
43. 407 F.2d at 81. See, e.g., Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp., 507 F.2d 1103 (9th
Cir. 1974); Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosp., Inc., 487 F.2d 502 (6th Cit. 1973);
Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973); Barrett v. United Hosp.,
376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mnem., 506 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1974); Communica-
tions Workers Local 10317 v. Methodist Hosp., 368 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Ky. 1974),
aff'd mem., 511 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1975); Mulvihill v. Julia L. Butterfield Mem.
Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020 (SD.N.Y. 1971). But cf. Note, State Action: Theories for
Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. Rav. 656,
674-75 (1974), criticizing the Powe v. Miles approach for failure to recognize that
government involvement, such as aid, supports and relates to every action of the
challenged enterprise.
44. See notes 48-56 infra & accompanying text.
45. 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974).
46. Id. at 453.
47. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
Jackson and Moose Lodge may represent a significant departure from Burton,
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"foster or encourage" the challenged activity before state action would
be found.
The Powe v. Miles approach has been followed in two cases dealing
with the limiting or forbidding of abortions and sterilizations by private
hospitals. In both cases the private hospital's position was upheld. In
Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hospital8 the court refused to find state action
based on receipt of Hill-Burton funds and extensive state regulation; it
held instead that there was no state involvement in the hospital's abortion
policy. The court relied heavily on Justice Blackmun's dicta in Doe v.
Boltoi,49 which it felt implicitly approved a Georgia statute that allowed
private hospitals to refuse to perform abortions." Furthermore, it dis-
tinguished Simkins as a case in which there was direct state involvement
in the challenged activity of disbursing Hill-Burton funds to racially dis-
criminatory hospitals.5'
In Greco v. Oranvzge Memorial Hospital Corp-.2 another court found
no state action despite receipt of Hill-Burton and county funds, lease
of the land and hospital building from the county for $1.00 per year, and
tax exemptions.5 3 The Greco court aligned itself, with courts that have
been more hesitant to find state action in cases in which there are no al-
legations of racial discrimination than in cases involving such allega-
tions.54 The court found that only the "internal affairs" of the facility
were involved, and stated that "the interest of the hospital in ordering its
internal administrative affairs outweighs the interest of the people dis-
in which the inquiry was not into whether the state was directly involved with the
challenged activity of the private enterprise, but into the "activities, obligations and
responsibilities .. . the benefits mutually conferred", which made the State a joint
venturer with the private enterprise in all its activities, not just the subject of
plaintiff's complaint. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724, 725
(1961). See Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to
Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. Rev. 656, 673 (1974).
48. 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973).
49. 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973).
50. See note 23 supra & accompanying text.
51. 479 F.2d at 760-61 & n.11.
52. 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975).
53. Id. at 876.
54. See Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974); Barrett v.
United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791, 805 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd nere., 506 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir.
1974) (dicta); Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1392-93 (N.D. Ind. 1970),
aff'd, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971). Cf. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36, 81 (1873) (Miller, J.): "[The fourteenth amendment] is so clearly a provision
for that race and that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its
application to any other."
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advantaged in this case." '- Relying on Bellin, the court held that there
was no "nexus" between the county's involvement with the hospital
and the hospital's abortion policy, and that the lack of such a nexus pre-
cluded a finding of state action.-5
Thus the relevant cases have evidenced a dichotomy of opinion to-
ward the issue of whether receipt of Hill-Burton funds constitutes suffi-
cient state action to make a hospital's refusal to perform abortions and
sterilizations a violation of federal civil rights laws. The enactment of
section 401 (b) of the Health Program Extensions Act of 1973 added
another consideration to this uncertain area, making the relevance of
the receipt of Hill-Burton funds to the existence of state action an even
more controversial issue.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 401 (b)
Interpretations of Section 401(b) by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Although the legal effect of section 401 (b) is unclear, the primary
legislative motivation behind its passage is not; angered by the Taylor57
decision, which required a Catholic hospital to perform an operation
repugnant to Catholic beliefs, Congress determined to break the link
between Hill-Burton funds and state action. Congress' intent, in the
words of several legislators, was to prevent the use of Hill-Burton funds
as a "lever" 68 to force denominational hospitals to perform abortions and
sterilizations, and to make clear that receipt of federal funds would not
be conditioned on the hospitals' assenting to such procedures. 9
Following vehement congressional debate over section 401 (b), the
federal district court, reviewing the preliminary injunction in Taylor,
gave a broad reading to the new law.60 It held that section 401 (b)
prevented a finding of state action merely because the hospital was a
recipient of Hill-Burton funds, and that the law effectively precluded
all federal court jurisdiction over claims against private hospitals in-
55. 513 F.2d at 880.
56. Id. at 881-82 & n.19.
57. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., Civil No. 1090 (D. Mont. Nov. 1, 1972).
58. See, e.g., 119 CoNG. REc. S5722 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1973) (remarks of Senator
Church); 119 CONG. Rc. H4147 (daily ed. May 31, 1973) (remarks of Representative
Heinz).
59. See notes 119-31 infra & accompanying text.
60. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973).
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volving allegations of state action as a result of receipt of such funds.
The court justified this result as harmonious with Congress' acknowl-
edged power under article III of the Constitution to establish and alter
the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts.61 Alternatively, it upheld
section 401 (b) as within Congress' power to restrict remedies that courts
may grant. Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center6 2 a district court case
contemporaneous with the final decision in Taylor, likewise held that
the "plain language" of section 401 (b) "revoked the ability of a court
to find state action" 63 resulting from the receipt of Hill-Burton funds.
Unlike Taylor, however, the Watkins decision did not characterize sec-
tion 401 (b) as a jurisdictional statute."
The first appellate court to review section 401 (b) deemed it a restric-
tion on a court's power to grant equitable relief. In Chrisman v. Sisters
of St. Joseph of Peace,65 the plaintiff sued for an injunction to compel
Sacred Heart Hospital to perform a tubal ligation that she had been re-
fused. The hospital had based the refusal on medical grounds, but Mrs.
Chrisman alleged that its reasons were primarily religious.66 The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the complaint on three grounds: mootness6 7 lack of the state action
61. Id. at 951. The court did not discuss, however, the power of Congress to
withdraw jurisdiction from state courts as well, within the language of section 401(b)
that receipt of Hill-Burton funds "does not authorize any court" to compel abortions.
(Emphasis supplied).
62. 364 F. Supp. 799 (D. Idaho 1973).
63. Id. at 801.
64. Watkins refused reinstatement and damages to a physician who was denied
staff privileges at a Catholic hospital for his failure to accept the "Ethical and
Religious Directive for Catholic Hospitals" (also involved in Taylor) forbidding
sterilization and abortions. Unlike Taylor, the Watkins court considered other
possible grounds for state action but did not find it in the hospital's tax exempt
status or other benefits received from the state, since the state was in no way in-
volved with Mercy's policy relating to sterilizations or abortion. Id. at 802. Watkins
also considered whether section 401 (c) prohibited the doctor's dismissal for his
insistence on his right to perform abortions and sterilizations. In essence, the court
held the section inapplicable. The law was intended to protect the "religious rights"
of hospitals and hospital personnel, whereas Watkins was dismissed for refusing to
agree not to perform sterilizations at the hospital, not for his religious beliefs. Id. at 803.
65. 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974).
66. Id. at 309 & nn.3-4.
67. The court found plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief moot since she had had
the requested sterilization performed at another hospital. Id. at 314-15. Moreover,
though declaring the request for equitable relief moot, the court conceded that her
requests for declaratory relief and damages made in addition to her injunction claim
were not moot. Accord, McCabe v. Nassau County Medical Center, 453 F.2d 698,
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required by section 1983, and most important, its view of section 401 (b)
as withdrawing the court's power to award injunctive relief in cases in
which state action was based on receipt of Hill-Burton funds. This inter-
pretation of the law's effect was justified as being within Congress' power
to restrict remedies available in certain causes of action.68 Like the district
court in Watkins, the Ninth Circuit did not construe section 401 (b) as
totally withdrawing court jurisdiction over section 1983 claims based on
the hospital's receipt of Hill-Burton funds;69 the court here viewed the
law merely as a restriction on remedies, which forbade injunctive relief
on those grounds. Considering other indicia of alleged state action that
might justify injunctive relief, the court weighed the use of state and
federal funds for construction, state licensing, and tax exemptions. It
found that these did not amount to state action because the state was not
specifically involved with the hospital's refusal to perform sterilizations,
a type of involvement it believed was a prerequisite to a finding of state
action.70
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the final
Taylor7" order denying injunctive relief, basing its affirmance primarily
on Chrisman. It did not construe section 401 (b) as totally withdrawing
jurisdiction, but as restricting the remedy. Considering other facts in
Taylor besides Hill-Burton funds, which might have provided grounds
for a finding of state action, such as tax exemptions, state regulation, and
private hospital's performance of a public function, the court found that
state involvement was still insufficient to give it jurisdiction. The state
was not involved so specifically with the challenged activity as to give
that activity the color of state law. 2 The court acknowledged that St.
701-02 (2d Cir. 1971). The Chrisman court distinguished the holding in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973), that the issue in a case involving the right to choose an
abortion was not mooted by the fact that the plaintiff had received her abortion.
Although in the case of abortion, the condition of the plaintiff was "capable of repe-
tition, yet evading review," id. at 125, citing Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219
U.S. 498, 515 (1911), here the parties to the Chris an litigation had stipulated that
"surgical sterilization by tubal ligation is generally considered permanent and irrever-
sible, and plaintiff would not reasonably expect to ever be obligated to undergo such
a procedure again." 506 F.2d at 314.
68. Id. at 311. The court also rather summarily dismissed establishment clause
objection to section 401(b), on the basis of its neutrality, citing Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Justice Blackmun's dicta in Doe v. Bolton, see note 23 supra.
69. See note 64 supra.
70. 506 F.2d at 313-14. See notes 45-51 slipra & accompanying text.
71. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., Civil No. 74-1142 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 1975).
72. Id. at 5-7.
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Vincent's had the only maternity department in the city, a factual dis-
tinction, from Chrisman, but concluded that this alleged "monopoly" "
of maternity services was not grounds for finding state action. The court
stated that there was "insufficient relationship" between St. Vincent's
refusal to perform the requested sterilization and its monopoly status,
and that the state was not at all involved with the hospital's possession of
a monopoly. Under these circumstances, the court concluded, no ques-
tion of state action arose.74
Section 401 (b) as a Withdrawal of Jurisdiction
The district court in Taylor rested its denial of relief primarily on its
construction of section 401 (b) as withdrawing federal court jurisdiction
over section 1983 claims against hospitals that were receiving Hill-Bur-
ton funds and refusing to perform abortions and sterilizations. This read-
ing of the statute is broader than that accorded it by other courts, al-
though suggestions of this sweeping withdrawal of jurisdiction appear
in other cases. The district court supported its holding by invoking con-
gressional power to alter federal court jurisdiction. Such power does
exist, but in the final analysis, it is irrelevant to section 401 (b).
Congressional power to alter lower federal court jurisdiction is de-
rived from article III of the Constitution, 75 under which Congress is
given the power to create inferior federal courts and to confer upon
them as much judicial power as it sees fit.76 Under the most widely ac-
73. See note 7 supra.
74. Civil No. 74-1142 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 1975), at 7.
75. Article In states in pertinent part: "The judicial power of the United States
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1.
76. The view that Congress is required to vest the inferior federal courts with all
of the judicial power under article III is distinctly a minority one, though it has
had advocates as influential as Justice Story, who stated in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-29, 330 (1816):
The judicial power of the United States shall be vested (not may be
vested) in one Supreme. Court, and in such inferior courts as congress
may, from time to time, ordain and establish. . . . The judicial power
must, therefore, be vested in some court by congress; and to suppose, that
it was not an obligation binding on them, but might, at their pleasure be
omitted and declined, is to suppose, that, under the sanction of the
constitution, they might defeat the constitution itself. . . . If then, it is
a duty of congress to vest the judicial power of the United States, it is
a duty to vest the whole judicial power. The language, if imperative as
to one part, is imperative as to all.
Accord, Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1949), reed on other
1975]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
cepted view of article 11I,77 the power to create federal courts implies a
concomitant power to destroy them entirely,-, with very few significant
limitations. Although Congress has not attempted to wield that power
to its greatest extent, it has from time to time imposed jurisdictional
limitations, which have been sustained by the courts. For example, in
Lockerty v. Phillips,79 the Supreme Court upheld the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942,80 which withdrew all state and federal court juris-
diction over regulations promulgated by a wartime price administrator.
The Act vested such jurisdiction exclusively in an Emergency Court of
Appeals from which actions could be appealed to the Supreme Court.
In Yakits v. United States,"' the withdrawal of jurisdiction by this Act
was held to preclude a defense to a criminal action challenging the va-
lidity of a price regulation, because a forum had been provided in which
the regulation could be challenged. 2 "Such a procedure, so long as it
grounds sub norn. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). See generally 13
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3526, at 110-15
(1975).
77. But see Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court
jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974), which argues that practically Congress can-
not abolish inferior federal courts. Since the Supreme Court cannot perform the
duty of case by case review of federal cases, the lower federal courts are required
under the Constitution to perform that function. Thus, they cannot be abolished because
they are constitutionally required, nor can their jurisdiction be curtailed because of
substantive disagreement with judicial decisions, but it can be restricted only in the
interests of judicial efficiency and reducing case loads. The line between restricting
jurisdiction to promote efficient judicial administration and to prevent an undesired
result, is, of course, difficult to draw. Eisenberg argues that an), examination of juris-
dictional statutes should begin with the presumption that forums must exist for federal
issues. Id. at 520-30.
78. See, e.g., Judge Sirica's statement in Senate Select Comm. on Pres. Campaign
Activ. v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1973): "Simply stated, Congress may
impart as much or as little of the judicial power as it deems appropriate and the
Judiciary may not thereafter on its own motion recur to the Article III storehouse
for additional jurisdiction. When it comes to jurisdiction of the federal courts, truly,
to paraphrase the scripture, the Congress giveth and the Congress taketh away."
The Supreme Court has spoken often of thp wide scope of congressional power
over inferior federal court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182,
187 (1943); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938); Kline v. Burke
Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 235, 245
(1845).
79. 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
80. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Star. 23.
81. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
82. The Pipeline Amendment, section 203(d) of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authori-
zation Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1652(d) (Supp. 1974), tracks very closely the jurisdictional
provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. It vests exclusive jurisdiction
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affords to those affected a reasonable opportunity to be heard and present
evidence, does not offend against due process." 8'
When Congress, however, has purported to withdraw jurisdiction
over a certain class of action from both state and federal courts, and has
provided no alternative forum, the courts have not respected the at-
tempted withdrawal of jurisdiction, but have treated the matter con-
cerned as open to their decision. The Portal-to-Portal Act" was passed
to eliminate liabilities that had arisen from an unexpectedly broad inter-
pretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.8 Congress attempted to deal
with the problem by eliminating the claims as a matter of substantive
law, and by withdrawing jurisdiction over such claims from both state
and federal courts. Faced with challenges to the Act as depriving prop-
erty without due process in violation of the fifth amendment, the courts
took jurisdiction in spite of the Portal-to-Portal Act and treated the chal-
lenges on their merits.86 In Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.87 the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the issue of withdrawal of
jurisdiction and laid down a significant restriction on Congress' power
over federal court jurisdiction:
We think, however, that the exercise by Congress of its control
over jurisdiction is subject to compliance with at least the require-
in a single court and it provides also that all challenges to the validity of the act on
its face be brought within 60 days of November 16, 1973. It has been questioned,
however, whether the restrictive jurisdiction aspects of the Pipeline Amendment are
valid, absent the wartime circumstances present for the passage of the Price Control
Act. The Court stressed the wartime emergency in upholding the 60-day limitation
on actions by those affected by price regulations under the Price Control Act. Yakus
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 431-32, 435, 439, 441-42 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U.S. 503, 520 (1944). See Note, Congressional Power over State and Federal
Court Jurisdiction: The Hill-Burton and Trans-Alaska Pipeline Exanples, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 131, 153-62 (1974). [hereinafter cited as Congressional Power].
83. 321 U.S. at 433.
84. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52,
§ 1, 61 Star. 84). 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 25,
1938, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Star. 1060).
85. In three cases during the 1940's, the Supreme Court had defined the term
"work week" within the act to include time spent in activities preliminary to time
actually spent on the job. In one six-month period, more than 1000 claims seeking
close to six billion dollars in unpaid overtime and statutory damages were filed in
federal courts, as a result of this broad interpretation. 13 C. WRIcH, A. MILLER, E.
COOPER, supra note 76, § 3526, at 116.
86. See Fisch v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 902 (1949); Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co. Shipbldg. Div., 168 F.2d 58 (4th
Cir. 1948); Miller v. Howe Sound Mining Co., 77 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Wash. 1948);
Hollingsworth v. Federal Mining & Smelting Co., 74 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Idaho 1947).
87. 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948).
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ments of the Fifth Amendment. That is to say, while Congress has
the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction
of courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that
power as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law or to take private property without just com-
pensation.88
The restrictions in Yakus and in Battaglia on Congress' power over
jurisdiction appear to invalidate the Taylor district court's reading of
section 401 (b). Reading the statutory language to mean that the receipt
of Hill-Burton funds "does not authorize any court" 89 to compel the
performance of sterilizations or abortions, purports to deprive all courts,
state and federal, of jurisdiction. Thus, such a reading denies aggrieved
parties all opportunity to be heard for violations of their fundamental
right of privacy in cases like Taylor 0 This result is a deprivation of due
process, beyond congressional power to limit federal court jurisdiction."'
When faced with a statute having an effect such as section 401 (b) was
given by the Taylor district court, other courts should follow Battaglia,
take jurisdiction, and consider the merits of the plaintiff's claim.9 2
The reading of section 401 (b) that was embraced by the Taylor dis-
trict court was so broad that it rendered the statute unconstitutional.
Such a reading was not mandated by congressional intent. As contrasted
with the Portal-to-Portal Act and the Emergency Price Control Act,
88. 169 F.2d at 257.
89. Health Programs Extension Act of 1973 § 401(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7(a) (1974)
(emphasis supplied).
90. Cf. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 188 (1943) (dictum): "A construction
of the statute which would deny all opportunity for judicial determination of an
asserted constitutional right is not to be favored."
91. See Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 521; Congressional Power, supra note 82, at
141-43.
It should be noted that the Pipeline Amendment specifically exempts questions as to
the constitutionality of acts taken pursuant to the Pipeline Act, and sets a limitation of
60 days following the act in question in which to bring an action questioning its consti-
tutionality. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1652(d) (Supp. 1974). This provision is also similar to the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, and its application in the pipeline context raises
constitutional questions. See Congressional Power, supra note 82, at 160-62.
92. Another alternative for federal courts construing section 401(b) as a withdrawal of
jurisdiction would be as a withdrawal of all federal jurisdiction (since that is within
congressional authority), but not of state jurisdiction. State courts then would be free
to decide the constitutionality of section 401 (b). Congressional Power, supra note 82, at
150. This course of action may not be sufficient to protect the right to privacy, how-
ever, in view of the state courts' inadequacies as defenders of constitutional rights. See
Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 510-11.
[Vol. 17:303
ABORTION: STATE ACTION
both of which contain explicit statutory language limiting jurisdiction,
section 401 (b) does not mention jurisdiction. An intent to restrict juris-
diction should not be read into an ambiguous statute,3 especially when
legislative history indicates no such intent. Withdrawal of jurisdiction
was not mentioned in the House report on the amendment that became
section 401 (b)," nor in the congressional debates attending its passage.
A key exchange in the House debate indicated the absence of intent on
the part of Congress that section 401 (b) withdraw federal court juris-
diction over actions against private hospitals for interference with the
right of privacy:
Mr. ECKHARDT.... Now, I am not so much concerned one way
or the other about the abortion question, but I am very much con-
cerned about not writing any laws that infringe on any courts'
rights to interpret the Constitution. If we create Federal courts, as
we have, and they are called upon to deal generally with the Fed-
eral law and the Constitution, I do not think we can hamper them
in their interpretation of the Constitution by means of a statute.
Mr. Chairman, I hope that is not what section 401 (b) is designed
to do.
Mr. STAGGERS . . . [Iln reply to the question of [Mr. Eck-
hardt] I would agree with him that it is not. The answer would
be: No, it is not.
Mr. ECKHARDT. Then do I understand correctly that we are
not attempting in the statute to curtail the exercise in the Federal
Court of any right which an individual may assert as his constitu-
tional right?
Mr. STAGGERS. Certainly not.95
93. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courrts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1399 (1953): "In the end we have to
depend on Congress for the effective functioning of our judicial system, and perhaps
for any functioning. The primary check on Congress is the political check-the votes of
the people. If Congress wants to frustrate the judicial check, our constitutional tradition
requires that it be made to say so unmistakably, so that the people will understand and
the political check can operate." See also Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
140-41 (1967); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 189-90 (1958); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319
U.S. 182, 188 (1943).
94. H.R. REP. No. 93-227, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 10-11 (1973).
95. 119 CONG. REc. H4148 (daily ed. May 31, 1973).
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Section 401(b) as a Restriction on Remedy
An alternative holding of the district court in Taylor,"6 and the inter-
pretation of section 401 (b) in Chrismnan97 and Taylor 8 by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, was that 401 (b) is a restriction on reme-
dy, forbidding the courts to grant injunctions compelling private hos-
pitals to perform abortions and sterilizations. This restriction was ap-
plied only to injunctive relief, as the courts sanctioned declaratory relief
and damages in such situations. This interpretation of section 401 (b) runs
afoul of the specific language of the statute, as well as of its legislative his-
tory, neither of which clearly indicated that the statute was meant to
withdraw a particular remedy from the judicial arsenal. 9 Such a reading
of section 401 (b) poses serious constitutional problems as well. For a
woman seeking relief for the infringement of her right to privacy, dam-
ages are an inadequate remedy. Performance of the operation is the
only effective remedy for denial of her constitutional right, a denial
that stems from the hospital's refusal to perform the operation. 100
When Congress creates a federal right, it has broad power to restrict
remedies;10 it cannot, however, deprive aggrieved parties of all relief
by withdrawing all effective remedies, without violating the requirements
of due process. 02 Only when other adequate remedies are available and
the restriction is deemed "reasonable" has Congress exercised its broad
power to restrict remedies.103 The Chrisrnan-Taylor interpretation of
96. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp, 369 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Mont. 1973).
97. Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 311 (9th Cit. 1974).
98. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., Civil No. 74-1142 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 1975), at 4.
99. The lack of language pertaining to remedy in section 401 (b) is notable as compared
with the language of section 1 of the Norris-La Guardia Act: "No court ... shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a
case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with
the provision of this chapter .... " 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). See Lauf v. E.G. Shinner
Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
100. Doe v. Bellin Mem. Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 1973); Congressional Power,
supra note 82, at 152.
101. Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 530-31; Hart, supra note 93, at 1366.
102. See 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.08[3], at 63 (2d ed. 1975). It has been
suggested that the Supreme Court, in interpreting section 10(b) (3) of the Military
Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3) (1970), has implied that
Congress may not withdraw the only remedies effective to vindicate a right once the
federal courts have been given jurisdiction over such right. Congressional Power, supra
note 82, at 139-40 n.57. See Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460
(1970); Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
103. 5 J. MooRE, supra note 102, 38.08[3], at 60-63. See also notes 82-83 supra &
accompanying text.
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section 401 (b) would withdraw the remedy of injunctive relief from all
available forums, state and federal. Since the only adequate remedy for
a woman refused an abortion or sterilization is the performance of the
procedure, this deprivation of injunctive relief leaves her no satisfactory
remedy. This restriction of remedy thus must be deemed unreasonable,
and the Chrisman-Taylor interpretation of section 401 (b), which pre-
cludes injunctive relief, must be viewed as a denial of due process. 04
Section 401 (b) as a Rule of Eidence
A third interpretation of section 401 (b) appears in Chrisman and in
Taylor. By holding that the statute precluded a finding of state action
from the mere fact of receipt of Hill-Burton funds, but that other
grounds for finding state action, such as tax exemptions and "monopoly"
status, remained open to judicial consideration, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit treated section 401 (b) as a rule of evidence. Since this
interpretation leaves a court free to take jurisdiction and to award in-
junctive relief if it finds state action on other grounds, it is not subject
to the due process objections that have been raised against the views
espoused by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as to the law's
impact on jurisdiction and remedies.'0 5 This treatment of section 401 (b)
as a rule of evidence, however, has a serious constitutional flaw of its
own. If section 401 (b) is construed as prescribing the weight that evi-
dence of Hill-Burton fun4s shall have toward a finding of state action,
then section 401 (b) becomes an unconstitutional legislative usurpation
of judicial power, under the rule of United States v. Klein.:""
Klein sued in the Court of Claims as administrator of the estate of a
decedent whose property had been seized by the Union during the
Civil War. An 1863 law 10 7 permitted recovery of the value of the lost
property if the claimant had remained loyal to the Union, and an earlier
case, United States v. Padelford,'08 established that a presidential pardon
(as had been obtained by Klein's decedent) constituted conclusive
proof of loyalty. The Court of Claims held for Klein on the basis -of
Padelford. While the Government's appeal to the Supreme Court was
pending, however, Congress passed a law providing that no presidential
104. See Congressional Power, supra note 82, at 152.
105. See notes 81-88, 101-04 supra & accompanying text.
106. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
107. Abandoned and Captured Property Act, Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 120, 12 Star.
820.
108. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870).
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pardon would be admissible in the Court of Claims as evidence of loyal-
ty, 10 9 and purporting to deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over
cases in which a claimant used such evidence. Refusing to respect this
denial of jurisdiction, the Court held that Congress could not prescribe
a rule of decision to the judiciary in the guise of a withdrawal of jurisdic-
tion. The Court held that such legislation went beyond "the acknowl-
edged power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations
to the appellate power." 110 Furthermore, it violated the concept of separa-
tion of powers, since it constituted congressional usurpation of the judi-
cial function of weighing evidence and construing statutes:"'
The court is required to ascertain the existence of certain facts and
thereupon to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has ceased, by
dismissing the bill. What is this but to prescribe a rule of decision
of a cause in a particular way?
* In the case before us ... the court is forbidden to give the
effect to evidence which, in its own judgment, such evidence should
have, and is directed to give an effect precisely contrary.
We must think that Congress has inadvertently passed the limit
which separates the legislative from the judicial power. 112
Klein does not contradict Congress' acknowledged power to change
the applicable substantive law during the pendency of a case, and thus
109. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 235.
110. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
111. See 5 J. MooRE, supra note 102, T 38.08[3], at 64; Abortion Implication, supra
note 19, at 261-62. Cf. National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 605
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
112. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146, 147. The importance of Klein has been questioned by
commentators and courts who find ambiguities in the case, undermining its interpreta-
tion as a clear prohibition of congressional prescription of rules of decision to thejudiciary. Eisenberg suggests that "a cautious reading of the case is appropriate,"
Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 527 n.167, and suggests reading Klein only as prohibiting
Congress from impairing the President's power to pardon, id. at 526-27.
Klein has raised also the problem of reconciling the duty of courts to follow changes
in substantive law while an appeal is pending, with the prohibition to Congress to pre-
scribe rules of decision in a pending case. See notes 115-17 infra; Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 568 (1962) (dictum). But see Abortion Implications, supra note
19, at 262 n.173. It should be noted that so esteemed a scholar as Professor Moore has
interpreted Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1 (1944), a case following Klein, as indi-
cating that Congress cannot "direct how constitutional courts shall decide a case,"
"without usurping the judicial function." 5 J. MooRt, supra note 102, 38.08[3], at 64
& n.28. See also Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62, 66 (1886); Battaglia v. General
Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 262 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1949).
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alter its outcome.1 13 Rather, Klein prohibits congressional prescription
of rules of decision, 114 as inconsistent with the courts' historic role as
final arbiters of the meaning of the Constitution." 5 This prohibition is
clearly applicable to the interpretation of section 401(b) that would
withdraw receipt of Hill-Burton funds from court consideration as
grounds for state action. By prescribing that the receipt of Hill-Burton
funds shall not constitute state action, section 401 (b), like the act con-
sidered in Klein, dictates to the courts the weight to be afforded certain
evidence and attempts to deprive courts of the freedom to give evidence
"the effect . . . which, in its own judgment, such evidence should
have . . " -16 Under Klein, this is an unconstitutional usurpation of
judicial power.117
In the absence of a clear indication that section 401 (b) was intended
by Congress to serve as a restriction on jurisdiction or remedy, or as a
legislative prescription of a rule of evidence, none of those extreme
interpretations is tenable; although they uphold the statute, they have
been shown to raise serious due process and separation of powers prob-
lems, problems that cannot be said to arise from the language of the
statute or from its legislative history. Since the constitutional problems
have arisen from judicial construction of the statute, rather than from
its wording or legislative history, section 401 (b) is not unconstitutional
on its face. In keeping with the well-established principle of statutory
113. See District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901); United States v. Schooner
Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 102 (1801).
114. See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 638-39 (3d Cir. 1974) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting in part).
115. "It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say
what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See also
United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 639-41 (3d Cir. 1974) (Gibbons, J., dissenting
in part).
116. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147.
117. See Abortion Implications, supra note 19, at 262.
Some commentators have suggested that an interpretation of section 401(b) as pre-
scribing the evidentiary effect of Hill-Burton funds for purposes of determining state
action may be saved by Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Morgan was
widely interpreted to hold that Congress had the power to define the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment under the amendments enabling clause, thereby exempting the
fourteenth amendment from the traditional rule that the courts are the final arbiters of
the Constitution. See Burt, Miranda and Title 11: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT.
REv. 81; Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91 (1966). For examinations of the Morgan rationale in relation
to section 401(b), see Abortion Implications, s-pra note 19, at 262 n.177; Hill-Burton
Hospitals, supra note 39, at 93-94.
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construction that a statute should be interpreted harmoniously with the
Constitution," 8 this Note suggests an interpretation of section 401 (b)
that avoids the constitutional flaws mentioned above and is more con-
sistent with the language of section 401 (b) and congressional intent at
the time of its passage.
AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 401 (b)
Legislative debates leading up to the passage of section 401 (b) were
replete with statements indicating that Congress did not intend Hill-
Burton funds to be used as a "lever" 119 to force hospitals to perform
abortions and sterilizations if such procedures were contrary to their
religious precepts. These statements evidenced a serious misconception
on the part of the legislators in regard to the district court's grounds for
the preliminary injunction against the defendant in Taylor v. St. Vin-
cent's Hospital.20 In Taylor, the district court found that Hill-Burton
funds and other indicia of state involvement constituted "state action."
This finding was a prerequisite to the court's power to take jurisdiction
under section 1343(3).121 Only after the jurisdictional requirement of
action "under color of state law" had been satisfied could the court con-
sider the plaintiff's substantive claim for abridgement of her right to
privacy by the hospital's refusal to perform the requested sterilization.
The hospital's receipt of Hill-Burton funds, therefore, was pertinent to
the jurisdictional requirement, but not to the gravamen of Mrs. Taylor's
claim under section 1983.12 Supporters of section 401 (b) in Congress,
however, seem to have interpreted the court's decision as construing the
Hill-Burton Act to compel hospitals receiving funds to perform abor-
tions and sterilizations irrespective of religious beliefs. For example,
Senator Stevenson stated that the district court in Taylor "based its de-
118. In other words, the court will not seek confrontations with the legislature by
deeming a statute unconstitutional if a plausible and constitutional reading exists. See,
e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 441 (1821).
See generally G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CASES & MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
159 (8th ed. 1970).
119. See note 58 supra.
120. Civil No. 1090 (D. Mont. Nov. 1, 1972).
121. See note 6 supra.
122. See note 5 supra.
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cision upon the fact that the hospital received Hill-Burton funds." 's
Similar misreadings of Taylor appear in the House debates. 24
The original version of section 401 (b), sponsored by Senator Church,
did not speak to the courts at all, much less to their jurisdiction or choice
of remedies; the object of the amendment, rather, was to prohibit the
imposition on hospitals or hospital personnel of a requirement to perform
abortions or sterilizations as a condition to the receipt of Hill-Burton
funds, if those procedures were contrary to religious beliefs or moral
convictions. 25 The fear that hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funds would
be required to perform abortions as a condition of assistance under the
Hill-Burton Act was paramount, at least to Senator Church. He spoke
of the danger that "zealous administrators [would require] the perform-
ance of abortions... as a part of their regulations pertaining to federally
funded programs," 126 and he emphasized the need for Congress, "which
has the power to impose such conditions as it may choose upon the ac-
ceptance of Federal money," 127 to "clarify [its] intent... with respect
to the significance of accepting Federal funding as it might apply to the
question of performing abortions or sterilizations .. ,2 Similar senti-
ments were evident throughout the debates. 29
Given the congressional intepretation of Taylor, and the clearly mani-
fested intent that hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funds should not be
required to 'perform abortions or sterilizations if their objections were
religious or moral, the most plausible interpretation of section 401 (b) is
that it confers upon hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funds the substantive
right to refuse to perform abortions and sterilizations when the refusal
is based on religious belief or moral conviction. 130 Following this view,
123. 119 CoNG. REc. S5718 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1973) (remarks of Senator Stevenson)
(emphasis supplied).
124. See, e.g., id. at H4147 (daily ed. May 31, 1973) (remarks of Representative Heinz);
id. at H4152 (daily ed. May 31, 1973) (remarks of Representative Froelich).
125. The original Church Amendment appears at id. at S5717 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1973).
126. Id. at S5717 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1973) (remarks of Senator Church).
127. Id.
129. Id.
129. Id. at H4146 (daily ed. May 31, 1973) (remarks of Representative Hastings); id.
at H4147 (daily ed. May 31, 1973) (remarks of Representative Heinz); id. at H4149
(daily ed. May 31, 1973) (remarks of Representatives Heckler and Burke); id. at H4152
(daily ed. May 31, 1973) (remarks of Representative Froelich).
130. See the exchange between Senators Pastore and Church, id. at S5726 (daily ed.
Mar. 27, 1973):
Mr. PASTORE: . . . My question is this: What the Senator from Idaho is
actually doing in his amendment is to say that Hill-Burton funds shall not be
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a court could take jurisdiction of a section 1983 claim against a private
hospital receiving Hill-Burton funds; it could consider the full range of
possible grounds for state action; and it could grant injunctive relief.
Section 401 (b) would constitute an affirmative statutory defense that
the court could consider in light of the impact of a defendant hospital's
conduct on a plaintiff's right of privacy. 1
31
Such an affirmative defense approach avoids the thorny due process
and separation of powers problems that have been raised by judicial in-
terpretations of section 401 (b). This approach is not, however, free from
potential constitutional problems. As was noted in the congressional de-
bates, a guarantee to religious institutions that they can refuse to perform
constitutionally-sanctioned procedures on religious grounds, without
the threat of loss of federal funds, is objectionable as a possible
establishment of religion in violation of the first amendment."
The basic requirement that government maintain neutrality to-
ward religion, neither establishing religion nor showing hostility toward
it, has been expressed in a threefold test for statutes facing establishment
clause objections. This test requires that such a statute must have a secu-
lar legislative purpose,' that the principal effect of the statute must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and that the statute
must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.3
denied to any hospital that does not choose to allow abortions to be com-
mitted within that hospital.
Mr. CHURCH: If the refusal is based upon religious beliefs or moral con-
victions against such procedure.
131. See Congressional Power, supra note 82, at 152-53.
132. 119 Co,G. Rac. S5720-21 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1973) (remarks of Senator Javits);
id. at S5724 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1973) (remarks of Senator Kennedy); id. at H4150 (daily
ed. May 31, 1973) (remarks of Representative Abzug).
The establishment clause objection has been raised in the cases interpreting section
401(b), but the courts have not discussed the problem in any detail. See Taylor v.
St. Vincent's Hosp., Civil No. 74-1142 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 1975), at 4; Chrisman v.
Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 311-12 (9th Cir. 1974); Taylor v. St. Vin-
cent's Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Mont. 1973); Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center,
364 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D. Idaho 1973).
133. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
134. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
135. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). The test for establishment clause
violations is not cumulative; a government program failing one requirement will be
held unconstitutional. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788-89
(1973), which used only the primary effect test to invalidate a program of tuition
reimbursement to parents of parochial school children and to parochial schools for
maintenance and repair costs.
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Applying this threefold test to section 401 (b), one can conclude that
on its face the statute neither directly aids nor inhibits religion to an
extent that would render it unconstitutional . 36 Governmental involve-
ment with the free exercise of religion is an area in which "strict neu-
trality" .37 must give way to "benevolent neutrality." 1's By providing
that a hospital's refusal to perform abortions or sterilizations would not
jeopardize its continued receipt of Hill-Burton funds, Congress has not
maintained a posture of strict neutrality; it has made an affirmative pro-
vision to protect religious beliefs. Were Congress not to respect those
beliefs, at least insofar as individual hospital personnel are concerned, 3 1
it is possible that individuals would be penalized for exercising their be-
liefs. Such punishment could in itself be considered a violation of the
free exercise clause of the first amendment. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has on occasion recognized that such penalization resulting from the con-
flict of religious beliefs with the law affords grounds for special treat-
ment of an individual. Rather than viewing the free exercise clause as a
barrier to this special treatment, the Court has seen it as compelling such
treatment.1 40 Applying this type of reasoning to section 401 (b),141 a
136. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
137. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947): "The First Amendment
has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and im-
pregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach."
138. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970): "The course of constitu-
tional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could well
defeat the basic purpose of these provisions .... [XV]e will not tolerate either govern-
mentally established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those
expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive
of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsor-
ship and without interference."
139. But cf. notes 140-42 infra & accompanying text.
140. The court upheld an exemption from the draft for religiously motivated consci-
entious objectors in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). The court did not
consider the claim that the exemption, section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j) (1970), was an establishment of religion;
rather, it construed the exemption in the statute to include all religious beliefs and to
exclude "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views." 380 U.S. at 165.
Section 6(j) was held to exclude selective conscientious objection in Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). The establishment clause objection that section 6(j), in
exempting only conscientious objection to all wars, constituted a governmental discrimi-
nation between different types of religious beliefs, was rejected; the statutory distinction
was held justified by "neutral secular" purposes, among them the avoidance of erratic
adjudication of conscientious objector claims. The Court also rejected an argument that
section 6(j) interfered with free exercise, because the burden on free exercise was
justified by substantial governmental aims.
In neither Seeger nor Gillette does the Court indicate whether an exemption from
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court could find a violation of the free exercise clause in penalties im-
posed on hospital personnel who refused to perform abortions or sterili-
zations for religious reasons. Thus, at least insofar as individuals are
protected by section 401 (b), the delicate balance that the statute
strikes between establishment and free exercise of religion would appear
to be constitutionally valid.
A very different question is presented insofar as the section purports
to protect the rights of institutions to refuse to perform abortions and
sterilizations without loss of Hill-Burton funds. No court has decided
clearly the issue of whether an institution possesses the same right
to free exercise of religion as is clearly possessed by an individual. 42 In-
deed, it is hard to conceive of an institution or organization per se pos-
sessing any kind of beliefs or putting them into practice. The argument
may be made that there is no need to protect the "rights" of institutions
in this regard, since the rights of hospital personnel are protected, and
the religious organization sponsoring the hospital is not directly injured
by the use of its facilities for abortions. As the issue of the existence of a
corporate "conscience" has never been litigated, let alone settled, the
constitutional status of the protection afforded to institutions by section
401 (b) remains uncertain. Should it be found unconstitutional, however,
sections 401 (b) (1) and 401 (b) (2) (B), relating to the rights of individ-
uals to refuse to perform abortions or sterilizations on religious or moral
grounds, could be held separable from 401 (b) (2) (A), which protects
the institution.
CONCLUSION
Section 401 (b) represents an attempt to resolve the conflict between
two constitutionally protected rights: privacy and free exercise of re-
ligion. The statute was a manifestation of strong legislative intent to
the draft based on religious belief (broadly defined in Seeger) actually was required
by the free exercise clause. Justice Harlan, concurring in Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333 (1970), faced that question in relation to section 6(j); he stated that Congress
could eliminate all exemptions for conscientious objectors without violating the free
exercise clause, that entirely neutral course being approved by the first amendment. Id.
at 356.
141. See note 12 supra.
142. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the court in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973),
mentioned, with apparent approval, the protection given by the Georgia statute to
denominational hospitals that would not perform abortions. There was no discussion
of the first amendment issues. But the issue was considered in King's Garden, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Commission, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974), though no clear
resolution was made.
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guarantee free exercise by protecting the rights of those who refused to
perform abortions and sterilizations on religious or moral grounds, even
though this protection might infringe upon the right to privacy of one
seeking an abortion or sterilization.
Section 401 (b) tells the courts and other public authorities that religi-
ous hospitals and hospital personnel shall not be forced to perform abor-
tions and sterilizations simply because the hospital has received Hill-
Burton funds, but it provides no guidance as to how that mandate should
be implemented. In attempting to achieve Congress' aim, courts have
read unwarranted and unconstitutional meanings into the amendment.
An alternative interpretation of section 401 (b) is available, one which
does not avoid all constitutional problems, but which is less sweeping
and more harmonious with congressional intent than those past judicial
interpretations. That alternative has additional advantages, as it permits
courts to consider the full range of grounds for state action in each case
before assuming jurisdiction, and to examine the merits of the substantive
claim for interference with the right to privacy. The interpretations giv-
en section 401 (b) by the courts of the Ninth Circuit deny injunctive
relief to a plaintiff refused an abortion or sterilization by a private hospi-
tal. Thus those interpretations preclude the only effective remedy for
the substantial deprivation of her right to privacy which the refusal en-
tails. For this reason, other courts should not consider themselves bound
by the holdings of Taylor, Cbrisman, and Watkins, but should feel free
to examine less sweeping alternatives in construing section 401 (b). 14&
The constitutional problems presented by section 401 (b), as it is pres-
ently being interpreted, emphasize the need for Congress to speak plainly
and clearly when it legislates in the field of constitutional rights. Section
401 (b) has served only to exacerbate the conflict it was supposed to
resolve. Persons seeking vindication of their rights to have abortions and
sterilizations performed, and hospitals asserting the right not to perform
them, must await an interpretation of section 401 (b) that will resolve
definitively its inherent constitutional conflict.
143. Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is the only federal circuit
court to have considered the validity of section 401(b) on its merits, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc, 44 US.L.W. 2233
(4th Cir. Nov. 6, 1975) recently held that a defense based on section 401(b) was not
available to the defendant hospital whose refusal to perform abortions was based on
the state's criminal abortion laws. The court ruled that the hospital's attempt to invoke
the criminal statutes as a moral obligation fell short of compliance with the religious
or moral belief proviso of section 401(b). Moreover, in finding the hospital's anti-
abortion policy unconstitutional, the court considered the reliance on state law to be
a strong indicia of the state action required by section 1983.
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